In type theory a proposition is represented by a type, the type of its proofs. As a consequence the equality relation on a certain type is represented by a binary family of types.
1 Introduction
Type theory.
Martin-L of's type theory 13, 14] may be seen as a framework for expressing constructive mathematical reasoning. The interactive proof assistant ALF 2, 1, 12] can be used to implement a formalization of type theory and to develop formal type theory proofs. The fundamental ingredients of type theory are those of set, element of a set, family of sets and dependently typed 1 function. 1 The type of the result of a function application may depend on the values given as arguments to the function, and in an m-place function f(x 1 ; : : : ; xm) or family of sets A(x 1 ; : : : ; xm), the range of the variable x i may depend on the values assigned to the preceding variables x 1 , . . . , x i?1 .
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By the propositions-as-types principle, a proposition is represented by a set, the set of its (constructive) proofs, and the logical constants, that is, the quanti ers and the connectives, are represented by corresponding set forming operations in accordance with the Curry-Howard analogy or the Brouwer-Heyting-Kolmogorov interpretation. When we later use familiar terms such as, for instance, set, relation or category, they should be understood in their type theoretic sense, which in most cases should be evident by the propositions-as-types principle.
Some of our concepts will be de ned by quantifying over the totality of all sets or the totality of all relations on a xed set. This should not be mistaken for impredicative quanti cation but should be understood in the light of the distinction between set and type. In fact, the basic machinery of type theory, as it will be presented here, may be summarized in the following three principles: the collection of types is closed under indexed product, the collection of sets form a type and every set is a type. We may, using a naive symbolism, depict the relation between set and type as follows: set 2 type and set type.
Among di erent versions of Martin-L of's type theory available in the litterature the present version corresponds best to the theory decribed in part III of 14]. The two most striking features of this version of type theory as opposed to other versions are, rst, the ample amount of type information explicitly given in the terms and, second, the absence of the equality re ection rule that would allow one to infer the judgemental equaltity between two terms from the corresponding propositional equality. In other versions of type theory the problems we are addressing may disappear completely.
Data irrelevance and collapsed sets.
When a construction is formalized, it must sometimes be supplied with data that makes the construction legal, without a ecting the nal result. We point at two di erent reasons why a function may be constant in one of its arguments. On one hand, the constancy may depend on the behaviour of the function or on the notion of equality used to compare output data. On the other hand, the constancy may have nothing to do with the behaviour of the function or the equality used on the output data, but with the type of the irrelevant data. For instance, any function de ned on a singleton set must be constant regardless of how we "measure" equality in the target set. Obviously, the knowledge that sets on a certain form are collapsed, in the sense of having at most one element, may simplify irrelevance proofs that without this knowledge would have to rely on an analysis of the context in which the irrelevant data appear.
Inductive equality and conventional equality.
The statement of an irrelevance theorem must use some notion of equality in order to compare (syntactically) di erent outputs, and the statement that a set is collapsed must use some notion of equality with respect to which all elements of the set are stated to equal each other. We point out two methods for dealing with equality.
First, inductive equality, where equality on a set is introduced by means of an inductive de nition with re exivity as introduction rule. Unless otherwise explicitly indicated we will use the term identity to mean equality inductively de ned by re exivity. Second, conventional equality, which does not assume the possibility of so to say extracting a notion of equality from an arbitrary set and thus demands equality to be de ned wherever it is used. Bishop 4] emphasizes the conventionality of equality, which seems to be the only way in which general quotient sets can be constructed rather than postulated. Conventional equality may be systematized by developing a theory of setoids where a setoid is a set together with an equivalence relation.
Remark. The relationship between the notions of set and setoid in type theory is, at least from a formal point of view, analogous to that between the notions of preset and set used by Greenleaf 8] in an analysis of Bishop's notion of set. In the light of this analogy, Greenleaf's view The distinction between sets, which carry an equality predicate, and presets (1.2), which do not, is a central one in LCST. The novelty of our analysis of the paradoxes comes from the recognition that an arbitrary preset carries no underlying identity predicate (3) . The paradoxes of Russell (3.4) and Cantor (4.1) arises from an unwarranted belief in the existence of an identity predicate.
Greenleaf 8] p. 215.
on presets and equality seems to be an argument against inductive equality on arbitrary sets. We prefer, however, to see this as a breakdown of the analogy between \set in type theory" and \preset". There is no logical problem with inductive equality, but rather a pragmatic one | one has to remember that inductive equality on a function type does not coincide with \ordinary" pointwise equality.
1.4 Categories in connection with type theory.
Recall the informal de nition of a category as a system consisting of a class of objects, and, for each pair of objects A and B, a set of arrows from A to B, and, for each object A, a designated arrow 1 A = 1 from A to A, the unit arrow, and, for each triple A, B and C of objects, a binary operation composing an arbitrary arrow f from B to C with an arbitrary arrow g from A to B to produce an arrow f g from A to C, such that composition of arrows is associative with the unit arrows acting as left and right unit, that is, such that (f g) h = f (g h) and 1 f = f 1 = f for arbitrary arrows f, g and h of the appropriate sorts.
The generalized algebraic theories (GAT) of Cartmell 5] may be used to present the axiom system for an abstract category. In doing so there is a choice concerning the treatment of arrow equality. One alternative is to express the arrow equations, such as, for instance, associativity of arrow composition, in terms of the built in equality that goes with every sort in the language of GAT, but there is also the option of introducing a third sort for (proofs of) arrow equality. The rst alternative would in the context of type theory correspond to expressing arrow equations in terms of de nitional equality and would lead to a too narrow concept. Therefore we follow the path indicated by the second alternative. As to the nature of the sorts used for objects, arrows and arrow equality, we will be a little vague concerning the objects, but usually insist that the arrows (with xed source and target) form a set and that the proofs that two given arrows are equal also form a set.
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1.5 Categories and preordered sets.
It goes almost without saying that the (constructive) notion of a preordered set coincides with that part of a small 2 category which does not involve arrow equality. Thus, to de ne a preorder on a set, is the same as de ning the arrow sets, the unit arrows and the arrow composition 3 operators of a category yet to be completed. In terms of the informal de nition of category in section 1.4, this corresponds to starting the category construction with a set of objects and then breaking o the construction when we reach the \such that" part.
Filling the gap between a preordered set and a small category, the objects of which are precisely the elements of the set, consists of de ning equivalence relations on the arrow sets and proving the category axioms, which in addition to associativity and the left and right unit laws also include the compatibility between arrow composition and arrow equality. The gap can always be lled by using the always true relation as arrow equality and we refer to the resulting category as the category with collapsing arrow equality.
Thus a small category is nothing but a preordered set with \nice" equalities on the preorder proof sets and a preordered set is nothing but a small category where the arrow equality has been stripped o .
1.6 The category of category structures on a set.
The balance between a set and a category whose objects are precisely the elements of the set is referred to as a category structure on the set. A category structure homomorphism is a functor de ned to have identity object action. We can turn the category structures on a set into a category using category structure homomorphisms as arrows. Since these are de ned to have identity object action we can, without using natural transformations, de ne two category structure homomorphisms (of the same type) to be equal if they always send the same arrow to equal arrows.
Initial category structures.
An initial category structure on a set is the same as an initial object in the category of category structures on the set. A trivial consequence of the de nition is that if a set has an initial category structure then, for any category, any family of objects in the category labeled by elements of the set can in a unique way be extended to a functor de ned on the initial category.
The identity category.
Central to our work is the view, put forward by Hofmann and Streicher in 11], of the identity proofs (that two elements of a certain set are identical in the sense of inductive equality) as the arrows in a category, the identity category associated with the set, where inductive equality is used again as arrow equality.
1.9 Identity in type theory without inductive equality.
Without inductive equality available at any set it is di cult to de ne a nontrivial equality on an arbitrary set. We can, however, specify identity as a relation capable of mimicking certain aspects of inductive equality. To this end we will introduce two classes of relations. A relation on a set is a logical identity if it is a smallest re exive relation, that is, it is re exive and contained 4 in any other re exive relation on the set. A relation on a set is a categorical identity if it is the preorder underlying an initial category structure on the set (cf section 1.5).
Observation.
Any categorical identity is also a logical identity. 5 Since any preorder can be extended to a category structure, it follows from the de nition that any categorical identity is also a smallest preorder. Thus (by an easy exercise) it is a smallest re exive relation. If we have inductive equality on a set then this is also a logical identity. This will be evident from the elimination rule for inductive equality to be stated in section 2. If we have inductive equality on a set and moreover inductive equalities on the corresponding identity proof sets then the inductive equality on the original set is also a categorical identity. After constructing the identity category it remains only to verify its initiality (in the category of category structures).
De nition.
A set is decidable, if it contains an element or if the assumption of an element would yield an element of the empty set. We may also refer to a decidable set as a D-set. A set is collapsed, if all its elements are identical. We may also refer to a collapsed set as a C-set.
A set has decidable identities, if for any two of its elements, the set of proofs that they are identical is decidable. We may also refer to a set with decidable identities as a DI-set.
A set has collapsed identity sets, if for any two of its elements, the set of proofs that they are identical is collapsed. We may also refer to a set with collapsed identity sets as a set with unique identity proofs or as a CI-set.
1.11 Unicity of identity proofs.
With a possible exception for the indexed product, the elimination rule for a set former in type theory may be constructed from the formation and introduction rules according to a uniform pattern which is made explicit in Dybjer 6, 7] . Thus we may talk about the standard elimination rule associated with a set former. Although one might expect the identity sets to be collapsed, it is impossible to prove in general that they are, as long as type theory is restricted to the standard elimination rules. This negative result is proved by Hofmann and Streicher 11], using a groupoid interpretation of type theory.
Thus uniqueness of identity proofs is not a general principle of type theory and can be established only in special cases unless explicitly added as an axiom. Hofmann's main results
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concern what you cannot do without 11] a unicity-of-identity-proofs axiom and what you can do with 9] it but he also contributes to our concern of what you can do without it. Hofmann 10] shows that the empty set, the singleton set and the set of natural numbers all are CI-sets. He also shows that the class of CI-sets is closed under the formation of identity set and indexed sum.
1.12 Monoidal coherence and the discrete category.
In the work on monoidal coherence by Beylin and Dybjer 3] , the notion of \the set of natural numbers seen as a category" plays a central part. On the informal level this category may be thought of as the discrete category de ned to have exactly one or no arrow from m to n depending on whether or not m and n are the same natural number. In their formalization, however, the arrows are de ned to be the identity proofs.
This means that what on the informal level is justi ed by the discrete arrow sets being collapsed, is in the formalization re ected, if not by the explicit use of a uniqueness-of-identityproofs lemma, then by proofs on the y of the relevant instances of such a lemma.
One interpretation of Hofmann's negative result 11] is that we cannot in general let the identity category play the part of the discrete category, since we cannot prove (in type theory) that the arrow sets are collapsed. In this context, the DI CI-theorem stated in the next section shows that whenever the discrete category on a set makes sense, that is, when the set has decidable identities, the identity category is equivalent to the discrete category.
The present result.
The present result is a generalization of Hofmann's proof, which is based on a decision procedure for equality, that the set of natural numbers has unique identity proofs.
DI CI-theorem. Any set with decidable identities has collapsed identity sets. We give a formal proof in the fragment of type theory generated by the indexed product, the binary sum, the empty set and the identity set (and the corresponding introduction and standard elimination rules). We note in passing that the DI CI-theorem combined with the negative result 11] on uniqueness of identity proofs shows that there can be no decision procedure expressed in type theory for the identity on an arbitrary set. As an application of the DI CI-theorem we will give an informal proof that the class of DI-sets is closed under indexed sum.
DI-theorem. The sum of a family of DI-sets indexed by elements of a DI-set is again a DI-set. This is proved informally in the fragment of type theory generated by the indexed product, the indexed sum, the binary sum, the empty set and the identity set (and the corresponding introduction and standard elimination rules).
In order to isolate certain aspects of the proof of the DI CI-theorem, namely decidability and the category theoretical view on identity, we give two theorems in type theory without inductive equality that in di erent ways can be combined with portions of the theory of inductive equality to reproduce the DI CI-theorem. The rst says that a decidable categorical identity has, in a certain sense, collapsed identity proof sets. The second implies that, in the presence of decidability, the distinction between logical and categorical identity disappears.
Coherence theorem 1. If a set has an initial category structure with decidable arrow sets, then these are collapsed with respect to arrow equality. We give an informal proof in type theory without identity sets, but with indexed products, indexed sums, binary sums and the empty set.
Coherence theorem 2. If a set has a decidable smallest re exive relation then this relation is a preorder for which the corresponding category with collapsing arrow equality is an initial category structure. We give an informal proof in type theory without identity sets, but with indexed products, indexed sums, binary sums and the empty set.
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we introduce ALF notation and informal type theory notation for the sets that we shall use, in section 3 we develop some of the theory of inductive equality by giving a detailed proof of the DI CI-theorem in parallel with the corresponding ALF code, as well as an informal proof of the DI-theorem and, nally, in section 4 we give proof sketches for the two coherence theorems and show how they may be employed in alternative proofs of the DI CI-theorem. 2 Notational issues for types and certain sets.
When we present the rules associated with the basic set forming operations, functions taking elements of sets as input and giving elements of sets as outputs are not enough. We also need functions that give sets as outputs. One reason for us to introduce a level of types above the level of sets is that ALF is organized in this way. Another is to make sense of the big quanti cations mentioned in section 1.1 and used, for instance, in the de nition of logical identity in section 1.9.
Types and ALF.
The formal kernel of ALF may be described as a dependently typed -calculus with a distinguished type, the type of sets, and a distinguished family of types over the type of sets that to each set associates the type of its elements. We will give only informal explanations of the notations associated with types, the purpose being to render some readability to the ALF code that we shall present.
Product type. If is a type and is an expression possibly containing occurrencies of the variable x such that (x = a) , that is, the result of substituting a for the free occurrencies of x in with the usual renaming of bound variables to avoid clashes, is a type for an arbitrary object a of type , then (x : ) is the type of functions that to an arbitrary object a of type assigns an object of type (x = a) .
Application. If , and x are as in the previous paragraph and b is a function of type (x : ) and a is an object of type , then b(a) is the object of type (x = a) obtained by applying b to the argument a.
Abstraction. If , and x are as above, and b is an expression possibly containing occurrencies of the variable x such that (x = a)b is an object of type (x = a) for an arbitrary object a of type , then x]b is the function of type (x : ) that to an arbitrary object a of type assigns the object (x = a)b of type (x = a) .
Iterated product, abstraction and application.
The notation is used in favour of ( b(a 1 ) : : : (a n )
In the iterated product, the variable x i may be omitted if it does not appear in any subsequent k , k = i + 1, . . . , n or in . In the iterated product, again, adjacent identical types need not be duplicated, so, for instance, (: : : x : ; y : : : :) may be abbreviated (: : : x; y : : : :) .
The type of sets and the type of elements. The symbol Set is used for the type of sets and, when A is a set, El(A) is the type of its elements. In communications with ALF, the El symbol is suppressed altogether and the colon is pretty printed as 2.
We may sometimes emphasize the distinction between set and type by writing 2 for \is element of the set" and : for \is object of the type".
We Remark. We will in general prefer the product type to the product set for representing universal quanti cation. In the presence of product types, the main use that we shall make of the product set is to translate a family of types into a family of sets to which an elimination rule may be applied as in section 3.2.1.1.1.
The identity set, I A (a; b). If A is a set and a and b are two of its elements, then I A (a; b)
is the set of proofs that a and b are identical. The proof of identity by re exivity is denoted r A (x) 2 I A (x; x) x 2 A] and, if C(x; y; z) x; y 2 A; z 2 I A (x; y)] is a family of sets, then, by I-elimination, a function c(x; y; z) 2 C(x; y; z) x; y 2 A; z 2 I A (x; y)] may be de ned by stipulating the values c(x; x; r A (x)) 2 C(x; x; r A (x)) x 2 A]. A, a, a) elimI ∈ (A ∈ Set; a, a' ∈ A; C ∈ (x, y ∈ A; I(A, x, y)) Set; c ∈ (x ∈ A) C(x, x, ref(A, x) ); p ∈ I (A, a, a')  ) C(a, a', p)  elimI(A, _ , a', C, c, ref( _ , _ )) ≡ c(a') Remark. We use the abbreviation a ' b for the assertion that a and b are identical elements, that is, that the set I A (a; b) is inhabited. 
The empty set, N 0 . This set has no elements and, if C(z) z 2 N 0 ] is a family of sets, we may, by N 0 -elimination, introduce a function c(z) 2 C(z) z 2 N 0 ].
The decidability set, D(A) = A + ( x 2 A)N 0 . This is not a new set, but the formal expression of the de nition of \decidable set" given in the introduction, section 1.10. In this section we will give a completely formalized and mechanized proof of the DI CI-theorem in the context of inductive equality. We will also show how the DI CI-theorem may be employed in a proof of the DI-theorem (that the class of DI-sets is closed under indexed sum).
3.1 Intuition.
We will occasionally adhere to some of the notational conventions of category theory. For instance, \f : A C ?! B" means the same as \f is an arrow (morphism) from (the object) A to (the object) B in (the category) C". The category label C may be omitted. If an arrow drawn in a diagram has a label attached to it then the label is usually a name for the arrow and not a name for a category.
In connection with functors we may in notation confuse the object action and the arrow action and say that a functor F sends an arrow f : A ?! B to an arrow denoted \F (f) : F(A) ?! F(B)" rather than the more pedantic \F 1 (A; B; f) : F 0 (A) ?! F 0 (B)" where F 0 and F 1 are the object and arrow action of F, respectively.
The identity category.
Central to our proof is the view of the equality proofs as arrows of a category. This means that for an arbitrary set A, the elements of A may be seen as the objects of a category, the identity category on A, where an arrow from the object (that is, element of A) a to the object (that is, element of A) b is the same as a proof that a ' b, that is, an element of I A (a; b) and where two arrows (of the same type) are considered as equal if they are identical (in the sense of inductive equality). One can show that indeed this gives us, not only a category, but a category where every arrow has an inverse with respect to arrow composition. We will prove the relevant parts of this fact when needed, cf 3.2.1.2. The identity category associated with a set is in a certain sense the \smallest" among all categories where the objects are precisely the elements of the set, that is, it represents an initial category structure. Some of the things we do with identity can be explained in terms of the universal property of the identity category, some of which we list below.
The operations identity coercion and identity mapping which will be introduced later.
The fact that arrows in the identity category are invertible.
The following naturality lemma, a special case of which will be proved and used in the proof of the DI CI-theorem. 
The singleton set has unique identity proofs.
To illustrate the use of naturality, we treat the case of the singleton set N 1 which has one element, 0 1 were commutative for arbitrary elements a; b 2 N 1 and u 2 I(a; b). Assuming for the moment the naturality of , this means that u a ' b so that, by the groupoid laws, if we have two proofs u and v that a ' b, they must both be identical to b ( a ) ?1 . The naturality of follows immediately by identity elimination. Note how naturality here is used almost verbatim in the same way as in the work of Beylin and Dybjer mentioned in section 1.12.
The general case.
In the case of an arbitrary set A with decidable identities, decidability is used to de ne a family of constant functions xy : I A (x; y) ! I A (x; y) x; y 2 A] to which the naturality lemma can be seen to apply | for a xed element a of A, we may show the family of functions ax : I A (a; x) ! I A (a; x) x 2 A] to be a natural transformation from the Yoneda functor to itself. The naturality equation gives, combined with the groupoid laws, a family of left inverses to the functions xy . This leads to a situation where we have a set I A (x; y) on which there is de ned a constant function with a left inverse. Clearly such a set must be collapsed.
Proof of the DI CI-theorem.
Here we give a formal proof of the DI CI-theorem, organized as follows. First, some elementary identity theory, second, the de nition of a constant \endo function" on a decidable set, (constancy lemma), third, a proof that a set on which there is de ned a constant function with a left inverse must be collapsed, (collapse lemma), fourth, the de nition of a family of left inverses to a family of functions xy : I(x; y) ! I(x; y) x; y 2 A], (left inverse lemma), and fth, the combination of the three lemmas in a proof of the DI CI-theorem.
Identity theory.
Before we de ne the groupoid operations on the identity sets and prove the groupoid law that we shall need, we introduce the operations identity coercion and identity mapping corresponding to the logical rules x ' y P(x) P(y)
which express that predicates are stable under identity and that any function This is a place where we, in the formal proof, need the product set in order to apply the elimination rule for identity. Set; a, a' ∈ A; B ∈ (A) Set; u ∈ I(A, a, a'); b ∈ B(a)) B(a' A, a, b)) I(A, a, c) cmpI proving that the inverse arrow is a right inverse with respect to arrow composition, we use Ielimination with the family of sets I(z z ?1 ; z) x; y 2 A; z 2 I(x; y)], which leaves us, after simpli cation, with inhabiting the set I(r(x); r(x)) for an arbitrary element x of A. Such an inhabitant is of course given by the re exivity of identity.
invrI ∈ (A ∈ Set; a, b ∈ A; u ∈ I(A, a, b) ) I (I(A, b, b), cmpI(A, b, a, b, u, invI(A, a, b, u)), ref(A, b) 
Constancy lemma.
On any decidable set a constant function may be de ned with values in the same set.
The proof will give two families of functions (for an arbitrary set A). Recall that D(A) stands for (the set representation of) the formula \A or not A". and, in order to de ne the function iscon A , that is, to prove that con A (d) is a constant function for an arbitrary element d of D(A), we assume that we have two elements a and a 0 of A, and consider the family of propositions (sets) C given by C(z) = con A (z; a) ' con A (z; a 0 ) z 2 D(A)].
By +-elimination, C(z) is proved for arbitrary z 2 D(A) when we have proved the special cases, C(i(x)) x 2 A] and C(j(f)) f 2 ( x 2 A)N 0 ]. Recalling the de nition of C and the equations of con, this leaves us with proving, after simpli cation, in the rst case, that I(x; x) is inhabited for x 2 A, and, in the second, that I(a; a 0 ) is inhabited for f 2 ( x2A)N 0 . The rst case is solved by re exivity of identity and the second case is solved by absurdity elimination | we can apply f to any of the two elements a and a 0 of A, to get an element of N 0 .
Collapse lemma.
If there is de ned, on some set, a constant function with a left inverse, then the set is collapsed. The proof will give a de nition of 0 xy together with a family of functions 00 xy (z) 2 I( 0 xy ( xy (z)); z) x; y 2 A; z 2 I(x; y)]:
We assume a set A is given with a family of functions xy : I(x; y) ! I(x; y) x; y 2 A] and we will construct a corresponding family of left inverses 0 xy . We use the groupoid operations to de ne 0 xy by the equation 0 xy (v) = v ( xx (r A (x))) ?1 v 2 I A (x; y)], and, in order to de ne 00 xy , that is, to prove that 0 xy is a left inverse of xy , we use I-elimination with the family of sets 0 xy ( xy (z)) ' z x; y 2 A; z 2 I(x; y)]. This leaves us, after simpli cation, with proving for an arbitrary element x of A, that xx (r(x)) ( xx (r(x))) ?1 ' r(x). But this is an instance of the right inverse groupoid law of section 3.2.1.2.2.
leftinv ∈ (A ∈ Set; nt ∈ ( x, y ∈ A; I(A, x, y)) I(A, x, y); a, b ∈ A; I(A, a, b)) I(A, a, b) leftinv
3.2.5 DI CI-theorem.
Any set with decidable identity sets has unique identity proofs.
The three preceding lemmas are combined in the following way to yield a proof of the DI CItheorem.
Assume that A is a set with decidable identities, so that we have a function d(x; y) 2 D(I(x; y)) x; y 2 A]. Using the constancy lemma, we de ne a family of constant functions xy : I(x; y) ! I(x; y) x; y 2 A]; any of which, by the left inverse lemma, has a left inverse. Thus we have, on every identity set I(x; y) with x; y 2 A, a constant function with a left inverse, so we may, by the collapse lemma, conclude that the set I(x; y) is collapsed for arbitrary elements x and y of A.
condi ∈ (A ∈ Set; di ∈ (x, y ∈ A) Dec(I (A, x, y) ); x, y ∈ A; u ∈ I(A, x, y)
3.3 DI-theorem.
The class of DI-sets is closed under indexed sum. Our purpose is to show the relevance of the DI CI-theorem and we will be rather brief on other parts of the proof. We assume a set A and a family of sets B(x) x 2 A] xed in the rest of this section. We use the following notations for the rst and second projections. is absurd. 4 DI CI in the context of conventional equality.
We give two coherence theorems in type theory without inductive equality. The rst theorem puri es the category theoretical view on identity and was obtained as an adaptation of the DI CI-theorem to work on categorical identity instead of inductive equality. The second theorem reduces the problem of nding an inital category structure to that of nding a decidable logical identity.
Coherence theorem 1.
If a set has an initial category structure with decidable arrow sets, then these are collapsed with respect to arrow equality.
Before the proof we observe, going back to the context of inductive equality, that, after constructing the identity category and proving its initial property, coherence theorem 1 can immediately be applied to a decidable inductive equality and give a proof of the DI CI-theorem. We begin the proof with some lemmas about categorical identity. These will be developed under the assumption of a xed set A with a xed initial category structure with arrow sets I(a; b), the usual notation for the arrow operations and arrow equality xy '. We will then add the assumption about decidability and show how the proof given in section 3 of the DI CI-theorem may be modi ed to give a proof of coherence theorem 1.
Identity induction.
Using the indexed sum and the existence and uniqueness of category structure homomorphisms de ned on the initial category structure, we may establish the following proof principle.
If P xy x; y 2 A] is a family of arrow predicates 11 which holds for the unit arrows, is stable under arrow composition and is compatible with arrow equality, and if a and b are elements of A, then P ab holds for every arrow in I(a; b). Using the assumptions about P, we can de ne a new category structure on A, with arrow sets a; b) to the rst projection fst ab . The meaning of this is that fst ab ( ab (u)) ab ' u for an arbitrary arrow u 2 I(a; b). The second component of ab (u) is a proof that the rst component fst ab ( ab (u)) has the property P ab , so we may, since P is compatible with arrow equality, conclude that u also has the property P ab .
The initial category is a groupoid.
Since the dual of the initial category also is a category, initiality gives a contravariant functor sending the arrow u 2 I(a; b) to an arrow u ? 1 2 I(b; a) . To Note that the left inverse 0 ab preserves arrow equality because arrow composition does so.
Adding decidability.
After assuming the arrow sets I(x; y) to be decidable, the proof is as in the case of inductive equality, but with some modi cations. First, we here have arrow equality instead of inductive equality on proofs of inductive equality. As a consequence the second part of the constancy lemma of section 3. This is a more explicit statement than the one given in the introduction. We will, however, not elaborate on the equivalence of the two formulations.
Remark. The commutative diagrams show that is functorial (for any de nition of the unit and composition operations on identity proofs) and that xy is a constant function. In fact, if u; v 2 I(x; y), then, with r(x) 2 I(x; x) for v, the commutative triangle shows that (w) and (u) (r(x)) are equal arrows for any w 2 I(x; y), in particular for w = u and for w = v, showing (u) and (v) to both equal (u) (r(x)). (Here, as usual, denotes arrow composition.)
4.2.1 Coherence theorem 2 and DI CI.
Before the proof we indicate how the theorem can be used to prove the DI CI-theorem. Clearly, inductive equality is a smallest re exive relation, so if it is decidable, it can act as I in the theorem. Then, after the construction of the identity category, the theorem gives us a family of functions xy : I(x; y) ! I(x; y). By the remark above, these are constant with respect to identity. By the commutativity of the left most diagram with u = r(x) we see that any re exivity proof is mapped to itself. Thus we may by I-elimination conclude that any identity proof is mapped to itself, so the identity function on I(x; y) is constant and hence I(x; y) is collapsed.
Proof of coherence theorem 2.
We assume a set A with a decidable logical identity I 13 with identity proof sets I(x; y) x; y 2 A] and re exivity proofs r(x) 2 I(x; x) x 2 A]. We also assume a category structure on A with, as usual, arrow sets written x ?! y, arrow operations 1 x and f g and arrow equality xy '. 4.2.2.1 Constant endo functions on the identity proof sets. Just as in the proof of coherence theorem 1, we use decidability to de ne a family of functions xy : I(x; y) ! I(x; y) which are constant in the sense that xy (u) and xy (v) are related by any re exive relation on I(x; y).
Epimorphisms and -arrows.
Since the unit arrow clearly is an epimorphism, the relation on A, given by R (x; y) if and only if there is an epimorphism in x ?! y, is re exive. Hence the smallness of I gives a function that maps an arbitrary identity proof u 2 I(x; y) to an epimorphism 0 xy (u) 2 x ?! y. Composing with we de ne xy (u) = 0 xy ( xy (u)). Let us introduce the term -arrow for any arrow of the form xy (u) with u 2 I(x; y). The rst of the following properties of -arrows is immediate from the de nition.
1. Any -arrow is an epimorphism. prove that the large triangle is commutative, it is su cient to construct the center point c and -arrows outwards, because then the small triangles are of the form indicated in the -triangle and are thus commutative, and the arrow c ?! x is an epimorphism because any -arrow is.
